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Fiji
The year 1999 marked the end of an
era in Fiji’s politics. Few events were
more momentous and unexpected
than the overwhelming electoral vic-
tory of the Fiji Labour Party and its
coalition partners in May and the
swearing in of Labour Party leader
Mahendra Chaudhary as the country’s
first Indo-Fijian prime minister. With
a new government taking office, there
occurred an upheaval in Fiji’s political
leadership not seen since 1987. Exit-
ing parliament were Prime Minister
Sitiveni Rabuka and National Federa-
tion Party (nfp) leader Jai Ram Reddy,
a veteran of Fiji’s politics for the past
quarter century. Also consigned to the
political wilderness was the nfp itself,
after failing to win a single seat in the
new parliament.
The prospect of a general election
in 1999, conducted under the provi-
sions of the 1997 constitution, had
always promised to make this a partic-
ularly interesting year. The introduc-
tion of open seats and the alternative
vote electoral system compelled parties
into forming multiracial alliances. In
1998 two rival coalitions emerged.
The first combined the ruling Soqo-
soqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (svt)
party with the Indo-Fijian based nfp
and the general electors’ United Gen-
erals Party (ugp). The other was a
marriage between the mainly Indo-
Fijian based Fiji Labour Party (flp),
the Fijian Association Party (fap), and
the western Viti Levu–based Party of
National Unity (panu)—the so-called
People’s Coalition.
The partnership that had been
forged between the svt’s Rabuka 
and nfp’s Jai Ram Reddy during the
review and promulgation of the new
constitution flowed into other areas
of cooperation. The parties agreed to
a seat-sharing formula in early 1999
that would see the svt contest all
Fijian communal seats and 14 open
seats, and the nfp all Indian commu-
nal seats and 11 open seats. The ugp
was given all 3 general communal
seats and 2 of the open seats allocated
to the svt. There was also agreement
that in the event of a svt-nfp-ugp vic-
tory Rabuka would become prime
minister, while Reddy would be
deputy prime minister.
No such agreement on seat sharing
or leadership was reached by the Peo-
ple’s Coalition, a fact that was heavily
exploited by its opposition in the elec-
tion campaign that began in April.
While the svt-nfp-ugp presented itself
as the more solid and stable coalition,
it branded the People’s Coalition “a
sham” and warned voters that its
members would fight over the posi-
tion of prime minister if they won. To
the People’s Coalition, however, this
was not an issue. The prime minister
would be chosen once the results were
in. The Labour Party also countered
by attacking the svt-nfp-ugp Coali-
tion for not having a single campaign
manifesto (unlike the People’s Coali-
tion). This exposed a fundamental
weakness in the alliance between the
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svt and the nfp that Labour in par-
ticular was keen to exploit. With the
svt campaigning on its record in
office, the nfp was faced with the
dilemma of having to “go soft” on its
partner’s policies, which it had previ-
ously derided while in opposition.
Thus its campaign was confined to
the more intangible and somewhat
vague areas of multiracialism, forgive-
ness, and the new constitution. 
The nfp also directed its fire at
Labour’s willingness to allocate its
preferences not only to its coalition
partners but also to a newcomer on
the campaign trail: the Fijian-based
Christian Democratic Alliance or
Veitokani ni Lewanivanua Vakarisito
(vlv). This emerged as the “third
force” in the election, fielding a num-
ber of prominent and well-connected
Fijian candidates. They included a
former army commander, Ratu Epeli
Ganilau; a senior civil servant, Poseci
Bune; and Adi Koila Nailatikau, the
daughter of President Ratu Sir Kamis-
ese Mara. While the vlv seemed torn
between moderates and conservatives
(especially on such issues as reactivat-
ing the Sunday ban and declaring Fiji
a Christian state), it nevertheless stood
united on its principal goal of unseat-
ing the ruling svt.
In this it found common ground
with the People’s Coalition, as evident
in their exchange of preferences.
Labour, fap, and vlv put each other’s
candidates ahead of the svt-nfp-ugp
candidates. The nfp expressed out-
rage at Labour’s tactics, branding the
vlv as an extremist party and Labour
as “devoid of morality.” Its campaign
advertisements played heavily on what
it thought was a vulnerable spot: “A
vote for Labour is a vote for the vlv
or the Christian party.” Commenta-
tors, though, described an “air of
unreality” surrounding the svt-nfp-
ugp campaign. While Reddy and
Rabuka naively complained about the
opposition “ganging up on them,”
other candidates warned of a coup
and bloodshed if the government lost
(SP, 25 Apr 1999, 1).
The People’s Coalition, on the
other hand, focused on the issues it
believed really mattered to the voters:
“land leases, corruption, unemploy-
ment, crime and poverty” (FT, 20 April
1999, 3). An ill-timed decision by the
svt government to proceed with the
restructuring of the Civil Aviation
Authority of Fiji, leading to the dis-
missal just before the election of four
hundred workers who did not accept
voluntary redundancy, provided pow-
erful ammunition.
While it was expected that the elec-
tion would reveal disillusion with the
svt (especially among grassroots
Fijians) and that Indian voters would
not be comfortable with the nfp’s
alliance with the old enemy, Rabuka,
most observers predicted that a win
for the svt and its allies was a fore-
gone conclusion. So confident was the
Review magazine, that its May edi-
tion published a cover story on “Our
New Cabinet”: a Rabuka and Reddy-
led government. In the absence of
national opinion polls, there was little
to go on. However, a Times-Tebbutt
poll conducted in early May put
Prime Minister Rabuka as preferred
leader (at 26 percent), followed by the
fap’s Adi Kuini Speed (17 percent)
and Chaudhary (15 percent).
Polling began on 8 May. With
compulsory voting introduced for the
first time, 437,195 voters were on the
rolls (100,000 more than in the 1994
election). There were 304 candidates
(including 10 women) from 16 politi-
cal parties contesting the 71 parlia-
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mentary seats. Twelve thousand offi-
cials were engaged to conduct the
elections, which were estimated to
cost f$6.7 million. Not surprisingly,
given the massive scale of the election
and the new and unfamiliar electoral
system, there were problems galore.
The most common were names not
appearing on the electoral rolls (one
commentator dubbed this “the elec-
tion of the missing names”), long
queues and delays at polling stations,
and the high incidence of invalid
votes (which was seen to reflect voter
confusion about the new system).
Voters were given the option of voting
“above the line” for one party only,
which gave that party the right to
allocate preferences, or “below the
line,” where the voter numbered each
candidate and thus allocated their
own preferences. More than 90 per-
cent of voters chose the “above the
line” option. 
Surpassing even its own expecta-
tions, the Fiji Labour Party won 37 
of the 71 seats. Its coalition partners,
fap and panu, also scored big wins
(11 and 4 seats respectively). On the
other hand, the svt and the nfp suf-
fered crushing defeats. While the svt
managed to hold onto 8 seats, the nfp,
as noted earlier, did not win a single
seat. The ugp secured 2 seats, the vlv
won 3, the Fijian Nationalist Party
(Vanua Tako‘lavo) won 2, and Inde-
pendents won 4. It was estimated that
while Labour did not rely on prefer-
ences to secure its victory (it would
also have won under the first-past-
the-post system), the svt’s defeat was
largely because of the preference sys-
tem used against it by other parties. 
The margin of the Labour Party
victory not only gave it a free hand to
form a government, but also led many
to accept what previously had been
unthinkable: Mahendra Chaudhary
for prime minister. As the Fiji Times
editorialized: “Chaudhry deserves to
be Prime Minister. A Fijian face would
be a sham and would be seen as such
by the whole nation” (FT, 19 May
1999, 6). The Daily Post called on
Chaudhary not to be intimidated:
“You have the mandate. The people
are on your side” (DP, 21 May 1999,
1). With his party’s endorsement,
Chaudhary moved quickly to secure
the president’s support and was sworn
in as prime minister on 19 May. He
then offered one of two deputy prime
ministerial positions to the fap’s Adi
Kuini Speed (the other went to
Labour’s Dr Tupeni Baba).
In retrospect, Chaudhary’s speed
precluded what may well have been
protracted and messy negotiations
with his coalition partners, some of
whom were openly hostile to his can-
didature. Both panu and the fap sup-
ported Adi Kuini and attempted to
persuade the president not to recog-
nize Chaudhary but to recognize 
their candidate instead. Ratu Mara’s
response, however, was unequivocal:
“For the sake of the country” they
should join the Labour government.
Still smarting from what she described
as Labour’s “lack of sensitivity” for
failing to consult with its partners on
the prime ministership, Adi Kuini
agreed to accept Chaudhary’s offer.
In conceding defeat, Rabuka (who
had won his own seat in Cakaudrove)
warned the new government not to
use its majority to implement anti-
Fijian policies. While accusing Indo-
Fijian voters of rejecting multiracial-
ism and “bloc-voting” against the
svt-nfp Coalition, he also blamed a
lack of Fijian unity for their defeat. At
the same time he rejected a proposal
that began to circulate soon after the
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election for Fijian parties to form a
“grand Fijian coalition.” “It is too
late for that,” he said. “I won’t con-
sider it because this will mean a return
to racial groupings and racial con-
frontation in parliament” (FT, 18 May
1999, 6).
With eight seats in Parliament,
Rabuka’s party was entitled to a place
in cabinet, alongside the fap and
Labour. (According to the 1997 con-
stitution all parties with at least 10
percent of parliamentary seats should
be invited into the cabinet). In form-
ing his cabinet, Chaudhary was per-
haps relieved that the svt put itself
out of contention by making what he
described as “impossible demands.”
These included four key portfolios
and Rabuka to be deputy prime min-
ister. The 17-member cabinet that was
announced on 22 May drew from
four political parties and indepen-
dents. In addition to Labour, cabinet
posts went to its coalition partners,
the fap (3) and panu (2). Chaudhary
also secured the support of the vlv by
offering it two key portfolios. The fap
was later given the Home Affairs port-
folio, bringing its cabinet tally to four.
Of most significance to observers
was the racial make-up of the cabinet:
11 Fijians and Rotumans and 6 Indo-
Fijians. In terms of Fijian representa-
tion it was also seen to be a regionally
balanced cabinet, although there was
a conspicuous absence of anyone
from the politically important prov-
inces of Rewa and Tailevu. Perhaps
alluding to the inclusion of the vlv’s
Poseci Bune and Adi Koila Nailati-
kau, Chaudhary commented that the
president, Ratu Mara, had “played a
very major role in the naming of my
Cabinet” (DP, 22 May 1999, 1).
As for the opposition, it was soon
evident that the svt leadership had
staged an internal coup by ousting
Rabuka as party leader. The svt
reportedly blamed their loss on
Rabuka’s multiracial platform and
coalition with Reddy. He was asked to
stand down in favor of known hard-
liner Ratu Inoke Kubuabola. Accord-
ing to Rabuka, “People thought that
my conciliatory stance and my leader-
ship of a racially based party in an
inter-racial search for harmonious
existence in Fiji were incongruous”
(Review, Nov 1999, 17). He was not
out of the limelight for long, however.
In June, the Great Council of Chiefs
elected him as its independent chair-
man, prompting Rabuka’s resignation
from parliament. Ironically this was a
post created by the council in an effort
to limit the influence of the minister
of Fijian Affairs, at that time Rabuka.
To some observers, Rabuka’s move
signaled a long-term plan to turn the
Great Council of Chiefs into a new
political force and focus for Fijian
unity, one that would also be the
power base on which he would build
his political comeback.
Despite warnings of a Fijian back-
lash and some outbreaks of violence
(including arson attacks and bomb
threats), initial reaction to the new
government was generally positive. A
protest march led by Fijian nationalist
Sakeasi Butadroka attracted only 150
people, a far cry from the heady days
of the Taukei Movement in 1987. The
widespread view seemed to be to give
the Labour-led government a chance
to deliver on its election promises.
These included policies that targeted
poverty and unemployment: stopping
redundancies, removing the value-
added tax from essential food items,
providing financial relief for cane
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farmers, reducing housing interest
rates, and improving health and edu-
cation services.
Among the People’s Coalition poli-
cies to attract most attention was
their commitment to a minimum
wage. Manufacturers, in particular
from the garment and textile sector,
strongly opposed this policy and
threatened major redundancies if
forced to implement it. The industry
employs about seventeen thousand
people and accounts for Fiji’s second
largest source of exports (after sugar).
By July, government policy had tem-
pered somewhat, as Chaudhary
announced plans for a minimum wage
scheme as opposed to a minimum
wage guideline of $120 per week.
According to the minister for Labour
and Industrial Relations, the govern-
ment did not want to “kill the goose
that lays the golden egg” and would
tackle the issue through consultation
with workers and employers. The
prime minister later stated, “We will
not impose a national minimum wage
without considering the ability of the
sector to be able to absorb it”
(Review, Dec 1999, 27).
The minimum wage issue was one
of several economic policies that the
government appeared to water down
once in office. On stopping redundan-
cies, the government was quick to
direct the reinstatement of workers at
the Civil Aviation Authority and its
offshoot, Airports Fiji Limited. How-
ever it was subsequently blamed for
causing 108 workers to lose their jobs
just before Christmas at what was
formerly the government shipyard
(now called Shipbuilding Fiji Limited).
It dropped Housing Authority interest
rates, but did not apply this across the
board as originally promised. It intro-
duced a 10 percent reduction in water
rates, while proceeding with the pri-
vatization of the Fiji water authority.
The value-added tax was removed
from six basic food items, and import
tariffs on some household and food
items were lowered, but the govern-
ment also announced plans to license
rice importers, a move that would
likely lead to a rise in the price of
rice.
The first People’s Coalition budget,
handed down in November, was
remarkable for its apparent turn-
around in key areas. Instead of signal-
ing a break with the past, Chaudhary
as finance minister delivered a budget
that many saw as continuing the eco-
nomic policies of the previous svt
government. Described by some com-
mentators as pro-business, the new
budget defied expectations by not
increasing taxes or duties, not aban-
doning market deregulation and asset
sales, and not shifting the focus of
government investment. At the same
time, he increased spending on infra-
structure, agriculture, health, educa-
tion, and social welfare, mostly in line
with election promises. One other sec-
tor to benefit was the military, which
was allocated a 12.7 percent increase
in its budget. The People’s Coalition
plans to finance its policies mainly by
using capital from the sale of govern-
ment assets, maximizing tax collec-
tion through better compliance, and
cracking down on waste and misman-
agement of government resources
(Review, Dec 1999, 30).
The general reaction to the budget,
especially of business leaders, was one
of relief. However, concerns were
raised about whether the budget went
far enough to stimulate private-sector
investment. There were also warnings
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that if the government was to fulfill
its social commitments, while contain-
ing public debt, gross domestic prod-
uct would need to grow at around 6
percent for the next three years, a
prospect that many thought unrealis-
tic (SP, 7 Nov 1999, 5). The economic
outlook in 1999 was nevertheless a
lot brighter than in recent years, partly
due to recovery of the sugar industry
from drought, record tourism receipts,
growth in garment exports, and earn-
ings from gold. There were good
prospects for new tourism investment,
in particular hotel development. The
economy was also benefiting from
devaluation of the currency in 1998.
In its election campaign, the Peo-
ple’s Coalition had made the economy
its priority and, specifically, the prob-
lems of unemployment and poverty.
Its grassroots support largely
depended on progress in these areas.
But two other pressing issues were the
long-term future of the sugar industry
in a free-trade environment and the
vexing land tenure problem. Both
were integrally related and, for the
Labour Party, both were of critical
importance to one of its main con-
stituencies—the Indo-Fijian cane
farmer. However, the land issue was
also fraught with racial sensitivities
and proved to be the government’s
Achilles’ heel—the focus of opposi-
tion-fueled Fijian antipathy toward
the government, as well as of conflict
within the Coalition.
With its political survival and the
long-term health of the economy
dependent on the resolution of the
land issue, the stakes for the govern-
ment could not have been greater. It
was therefore surprising and disap-
pointing that in their first seven
months in office Chaudhary and his
team succeeded in polarizing the
debate even further, making the pros-
pect for compromise and agreement
ever more elusive. The prime minister
seemed to get off to a good start in
June, when he addressed the Great
Council of Chiefs (becoming only 
the second Indo-Fijian after Jai Ram
Reddy to do so). He promised close
consultation and dialogue on issues of
crucial concern to indigenous Fijians.
In spelling out his government’s
approach to the land issue, Chaud-
hary indicated that he would continue
with the previous government’s policy
of ensuring the use of Crown land by
indigenous Fijians. The new govern-
ment would also work closely with
the Native Lands Trust Board (nltb)
and landowners in planning future
land use policy.
What soon became clear, however,
was that unlike the svt government,
the Chaudhary government was com-
mitted to retaining the Agricultural
Landlord and Tenant Act (alta). This
legislation provided for minimum
(and maximum) thirty-year leases and
was the framework under which most
agricultural land was leased. But with
most alta leases expiring at the end
of the 1990s and in the first decade of
the new century, the pressure was on
to find a successor arrangement that
accommodated landowners’ needs as
well as providing farmers with secure
tenure.
The previous government’s policy
had focused on the resettlement of
displaced farmers and had set up the
Land Development and Resettlement
Unit to either purchase freehold land
or acquire leases on other vacant land.
The svt government, together with
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the Great Council of Chiefs, had also
endorsed an nltb report that recom-
mended that after leases expire, any
new negotiations for leasing Fijian
land should be conducted under the
Native Land Trust Act. This legisla-
tion was seen as more beneficial to
landowners than alta as it gave them
flexibility in issuing rolling leases that
had no minimum or maximum time-
frame. In general, their policy favored
a return of land to Fijians in order to
provide them with opportunities for
farming and employment creation.
After setting up an alta subcom-
mittee to hold talks with the nltb,
Chaudhary announced in July that he
was putting on hold the farmer reset-
tlement program. The idea of a five-
year moratorium was mooted, where
farmers and tenants would be permit-
ted to remain on their land until the
future of alta was resolved (for
Chaudhary this meant an amended
version of alta being adopted by Par-
liament). The prime minister also pro-
posed that farmers who did not want
to be resettled after the expiry of their
leases would be provided with a
“rehabilitation grant” of $28,000.
Later in the year Chaudhary dis-
banded the Land Development and
Resettlement Unit, citing dubious
deals and waste of public funds. In 
its place the government planned to
establish a Land Use Commission,
which would develop and implement
policy for ensuring the long-term and
productive use of all available arable
land. 
These moves triggered angry
responses from some landowners and
high chiefs. A major landowner in Ba
province warned that landowners
would “die fighting” to keep their
land. Fijian political parties also
rejected any attempts to extend alta
leases, saying they would “resist, by
force if necessary, any such unlawful
attempt to deprive [Fijians] of their
last valuable asset” (FT, 10 Aug 1999,
3). A September meeting of the Great
Council of Chiefs discussed the gov-
ernment’s submissions on land. It reaf-
firmed its call for future leases to be
based on the Native Lands Trust Act,
arguing that alta was no longer ten-
able, being inequitable to landowners.
It also rejected the idea of a Land Use
Commission. By year’s end the situa-
tion seemed to have deadlocked.
With the land issue stirring up
Fijian hostility toward the govern-
ment, talk again surfaced of a “grand
Fijian coalition,” based on Fijian
political parties. The main proponents
appeared to be the fap backbencher
Ratu Tu‘uakitau Cokanauto and svt
leader Ratu Inoke Kubuabola. Ratu
Tu‘uakitau, who had won his seat on
a recount, had emerged as a vocal
critic of the government and of Adi
Kuini’s leadership of the fap. Among
other things, he claimed that Adi
Kuini had compromised the party’s
position by accepting only four cabi-
net posts and that she did not consult
the party on its senate nominees. He
also criticized government policies,
taking the svt line that it was “not a
government for the Fijian people.” In
September he was elected party leader
by an fap executive meeting, but Adi
Kuini applied for a judicial review,
which she won, and was subsequently
reelected party leader by the fap’s
annual general meeting. The split in
the party executive was between fap
cabinet ministers who supported the
Coalition, and fap backbenchers who
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acted more like opposition members.
Early in the New Year (2000), Ratu
Tu‘uakitau took advantage of Adi
Kuini’s absence overseas, where she
was receiving medical treatment, and
his position as acting party leader, to
threaten to pull the fap out of the
Coalition.
The fap was not the only Coalition
partner to suffer internal conflict.
panu’s leader, Apisai Tora (who had
lost his seat in the election), also
backed the concept of a “grand Fijian
coalition” and had agitated against
the Chaudhary government since its
election. In September he called for
panu’s four members of Parliament to
withdraw their support for the gov-
ernment. Instead the members suc-
ceeded in ousting Tora as party leader,
electing in his place the minister for
Youth, Sport and Employment Oppor-
tunities, Ponipate Lesavua. The four
panu parliamentarians reaffirmed
their support for the Coalition.
The prospects of a “grand Fijian
coalition” emerging as a real threat to
the government appeared limited, for
now, by the desire of Fijian cabinet
ministers to keep their jobs and the
lack of any clear leadership of such a
coalition. However what remained a
weak spot for the government (and a
potential source of trouble) was the
perception of the Chaudhary govern-
ment as being “not for Fijians.” An
end-of-year assessment of the prime
minister was that he had not shown
enough sensitivity to Fijian protocol;
nor had he “reached out” enough to
the Fijian chiefs, in particular over the
land issue (Review, Jan 2000, 20–22).
So suspicious had landowners become
of the government that it was impos-
sible to hold a rational debate about
the future of land, despite the merits
of the government’s proposed Land
Use Commission. It did not help when
Deputy Prime Minister and Labour
stalwart Tupeni Baba, in an interview
with the Fiji Times, admitted that the
government needed to be more careful
in the area of Fijian tradition. He also
acknowledged that some Fijian civil
servants felt marginalized by the trans-
fers and appointments made by the
new government.
Some of the blame for this problem
lay with Chaudhary’s leadership style
and his tendency to not consult or
take advice. As was remarked on a
number of occasions, Chaudhary
tended to run his government the
same way he ran a union or a political
party: with an iron fist. Although by
no means the first prime minister to be
branded arrogant, Chaudhary proved
extremely intolerant of criticism, and
his relationship with the media at
times bordered on open warfare. He
also showed a stubborn disregard for
good public relations, stirring contro-
versies over such issues as the appoint-
ment of his son to be his private secre-
tary and renovations to his private
home paid for by the government.
In a revealing insight, Chaudhary
described former Singaporean Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew as a visionary
and leader he admired. “Some people
say he is a dictator. But he is a strong
leader and he has delivered” (Review,
Jan 2000, 25). Whether or not Chaud-
hary and his government deliver
remains to be seen. There is no doubt
that Chaudhary has engineered a his-
toric electoral victory and political
realignment in Fiji. With an end-of-
year approval rating of 62 percent, he
has an unprecedented opportunity to
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guide the country toward greater
prosperity and a more promising
future. The hope is that this opportu-
nity is not squandered.
sandra tarte
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New Caledonia
The year 1999 saw the first real test
of New Caledonia’s new governing
statutes, based on the Noumea Accord
of May 1998. Just before Christmas
1998, the French Parliament in Paris
passed into law provisions that would
irreversibly transfer powers to New
Caledonia over the next fifteen to
twenty years, allow for a local presi-
dent to be elected by Congress, and
also permit that legislative body to
enact “laws of the country” (pir, 23
Dec 1998), thus granting significantly
more self-government in a transitional
period of shared sovereignty. High-
lights of 1999 would be the May elec-
tions and their impact, quasi-political
labor union unrest, and debates about
the future.
Some critics of the Noumea Accord
had warned that it would empower
anti-independence politicians from the
multiethnic, industrial Southern
Province (where the capital, Noumea,
is located and 70 percent of the popu-
lation lives) to make the new “laws of
the country” and thus would relegate
the nationalist parties to a minority,
opposition role in Congress (Maclellan
1999). Rock Wamytan of the Front de
Libération Nationale Kanak et Social-
iste (flnks) and Jacques Lafleur of
the loyalist Rassemblement pour la
Calédonie dans la République (rpcr)
had both heralded the accord, but for
different reasons. Lafleur was pleased
at assuredly forestalling independence
during his career, while Wamytan was
content with the concessions made
short of independence, that is, increas-
ing autonomy as a step toward decol-
onization. As the May provincial elec-
tions neared, gamblers lined up behind
two emerging patronage systems, that
of the flnks and the rpcr, while
splinter groups took their own stands
or crossed over the political divide.
The election results were more
encouraging for the rpcr than for the
flnks, but neither could claim a clear
majority in the Congress. The rpcr
won 24 of 54 seats, but Lafleur voiced
disappointment that the right-wing
Front National, which doubled its
seats to 4, had kept his party from
clear control by scaring people about
the future. In addition, dissident loy-
alist Didier Leroux’ Alliance pour la
Calédonie won 3 seats (an increase of
one) by campaigning against Lafleur’s
monopolism. On the nationalist side,
the flnks won 12 seats, the Parti de
Libération Kanak (Palika) 6, and
Nidoish Naisseline’s Libération Kanak
Socialiste 1, for a total of 19 pro-
independence seats. Dissident moder-
ates from the nationalist camp had
formed the gradualist Fédération des
Comités de Coordination Indépen-
dantistes (fcci) and won four seats,
which provided Lafleur with the ally
he needed to form the requisite
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majority of 28 in Congress. He called
the fcci “a party of peace” (pir, 11
May 1999).
In the provincial assemblies, the
rpcr dominated the South, holding
25 of 40 seats, but the flnks and
other nationalist parties kept control
of the North (14 of 22 seats) and
Islands (10 of 14 seats), perpetuating
the quasi-partition of the country into
two political camps that has tended to
prevail for a decade and a half. For-
mer Northern Province President Leo-
pold Joredié found himself in the
opposition, as a representative of the
fcci, while Paul Neaoutyine, mayor
of Poindimié, led the largest bloc in
the North, that of Palika, which out-
polled the flnks 8–6. In the Islands,
the nationalists made enough gains to
avoid power-sharing, as Naisseline
had done with the rpcr after 1995,
but in the South loyalist parties con-
trolled all but 6 seats out of 40.
French High Commissioner Domi-
nique Bur assured people that his
office would continue to “be the
guarantor of public liberty, also of
legalities” (pir, 12 May 1999), despite
a rather biased record of Parisian sup-
port for loyalists in the courts. Les
Nouvelles-Calédoniennes, the local
daily paper, called the elections a vic-
tory for both the rpcr and the flnks
but also noted that the Front National
had established itself in New Caledo-
nia, having drawn votes away from
other loyalists (NC, 10 May 1999).
Tensions emerged as the newly
elected representatives formed a gov-
ernment. When Lafleur bragged in
advance that his coalition would
make the anti-independence mayor of
Noumea, Jean Lèques, president of
the executive, Nicole Waia, the out-
spoken head of the radical Kanak sta-
tion Radio Djiido who had just won 
a Congressional seat, proposed that
the presidency rotate between the
rpcr and flnks (pir, 13 May 1999).
Lafleur’s prediction about Lèques was
accurate, and the rpcr-fcci took 7 
of the 11 seats in the new cabinet,
including economics, education, and
labor, while the flnks received only
4, such as health and culture. The
vice-presidency went to Joredié of the
fcci. Wamytan immediately accused
the new government of “drifting away
from the spirit and the letter of the
Noumea Accord” (ran, 31 May 1999),
and he also criticized Joredié’s posi-
tion, arguing that the fcci was not a
true independence party. Raphael
Mapou, former Palika leader and now
president of the fcci, retorted that the
flnks “has fulfilled its historical mis-
sion. Today the challenge of the
Noumea Accord is to move on, to
bring people together.” He justified
the fcci-rpcr alliance, saying it
would bridge the two sides and
change people’s attitudes (pir, 7 June
1999). When the dissident fcci first
organized a year earlier, Mapou had
accused the flnks of losing touch
with its base, since the goal of a
Kanak socialist state was “no longer
relevant in the current political con-
text [and] too abstract” (abc, 19 May
1998). Sadly for the fcci, Vice Presi-
dent Joredié ended 1999 under a
cloud of financial scandal, for nepo-
tism during his tenure as former flnks
president of the Northern Province
(NC, 13 Dec 1999).
The new government began meet-
ing in early June, but French Minister
of Overseas Territories Jean-Jack
Queyranne swore it in officially on 
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21 June, hailing it as a step toward
decolonization, as the territory builds
its own identity in the region, apart
from France (pir, 21 June 1999). A
few days later, Thierry Lataste
replaced Bur as French high commis-
sioner, a promotion after two years of
service under Bur in New Caledonia
(NC, 24 June 1999). The French
National Assembly allocated the
equivalent of more than one billion
US dollars to be spent in its overseas
departments and territories in 2000,
an increase of 3.6 percent over 1999.
Queyranne explained that the French
state would not withdraw from its
dependencies simply because “auton-
omy becomes more prominent” (pir,
19 Nov 1999). In Honolulu in Sep-
tember, French Ambassador Pierre
Garrigue-Guyonnaud, permanent sec-
retary for the Pacific, announced that
his goal was to expand French
engagement with the Pacific via its
territories. In the 1980s, New Caledo-
nia had been “stumbling around in
crisis, bumping into walls,” he said,
but the Noumea Accord represented a
consensual solution of shared sover-
eignty (Garrigue-Guyonnaud 1999).
France had agreed to continue fund-
ing training courses and personnel
exchanges with Vanuatu (pir, 29 Mar
1999), and it sent a thousand New
Caledonian soldiers on a UN peace-
keeping mission to East Timor (NC, 
15 Oct 1999). 
Meanwhile, the Melanesian Spear-
head Group discussed arrangements
to facilitate free trade among its mem-
bers, which include not only four sov-
ereign states but also the flnks.
Spearhead foreign ministers voiced
concern over “the level of involve-
ment by Melanesians in the new New
Caledonian Parliament,” since the
flnks held a minority of cabinet 
seats (pir, 30 Mar, 29 June 1999). 
In August, delegations from both the
South Pacific Forum and the United
Nations visited New Caledonia to
speak to the leading political parties
about progress toward self-determina-
tion under the Noumea Accord.
Wamytan complained to them about
the lack of “collegiality” in the new
government, but Lafleur claimed that
the flnks and the rpcr were no
longer adversaries but “partners” (NC,
20, 25 Aug 1999). France attempted
to send New Caledonian President
Lèques to Palau to attend the annual
South Pacific Forum summit for the
first time, but his French military
plane broke down in Australia, leav-
ing only Wamytan to represent his
country at the Forum, though he was
officially not allowed to speak because
he was not head of state (NC, 5 Oct
1999). The flnks had been attending
the Forum informally for thirteen
years already, to pave the way for
wider participation by the country in
international organizations (NC, 6 Oct
1999). Despite Lèques’ absence, the
Forum formally granted New Caledo-
nia observer status at future meetings,
based on its apparently clear path of
advancement toward self-government
(ran, 12 Oct 1999).
These ongoing contradictions
reached a peak in October, when the
French Senate was due to vote on a
constitutional amendment passed by
the French lower house, the National
Assembly, the previous year. The
amendment would change French
Polynesia from an overseas territory
to an overseas “country” (without full
sovereignty), allow New Caledonia
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and French Polynesia to have their
own citizenship, and limit the elec-
torate that could vote in a future ref-
erendum on New Caledonian inde-
pendence. The flnks wanted to freeze
the electoral roll as of 1998, while the
rpcr wanted a more liberal criterion
of ten years’ residence in New Cale-
donia (NC, 30 Sep 1999). Lafleur had
already objected to French Polynesia’s
being allowed to become an overseas
country, arguing that it would
amount to “independence within
France,” adding, “If France pours so
much money into French Polynesia, it
should have control of it” (NC, 24
June 1999). He and Pierre Frogier,
both rpcr members of the National
Assembly, went to France to consult
with Queyranne and Gaullist Presi-
dent Jacques Chirac. The posturing in
Paris included a threat by Wamytan
to pull out of the New Caledonian
cabinet because the rpcr was failing
to share power as the Noumea Accord
prescribed (pir, 1 Oct 1999), and a
threat from Lafleur to resign from
Chirac’s metropolitan Rassemblement
pour la République if the Caledonian
electoral rolls were frozen. Lafleur
told the press, “The Noumea Accord,
that’s me” (NC, 7, 21 Oct 1999), thus
paraphrasing the famous seventeenth
century claim by King Louis XIV of
France that he was the state. After
lobbying by both sides, the Senate
passed the bill, defining New Cale-
donian citizens as having resided in
the country for ten years before 1998,
and Chirac called for the full French
Congress to convene in January 2000
to give its combined approval to the
measure (NC, 13, 27 Oct 1999).
Even more dramatic than the May
and October politicking was ongoing
industrial action by New Caledonia’s
powerful labor unions, which in the
past have often served to put pressure
on  political leaders to make progress.
The year began with the arrest and
imprisonment of four dock workers
for instigating a militant blockade of
Noumea’s port during the campaign-
ing for the referendum that approved
the Noumea Accord in November
1998 (ran, 28 Jan 1999). Sectors of
intense union strike actions would
include the nickel mining industry,
commercial companies run by Lafleur
or his family and friends, and the fire
department, airports, port, and radio
station. In mid-May, the Nakety nickel
mine in the Northern Province was
closed and occupied by local residents
after the owners, the Ballande Group,
laid off thirty workers. Rival villages
blockaded the site, a mining company
employee was shot by a sniper, and
electric power was sabotaged, in what
Les Nouvelles-Calédoniennes called a
“tribal war” (NC, 8 Sep, 20 Aug 1999).
In response, nickel truckers protested
with sixty-three vehicles in Noumea’s
streets, on the same day that Noumea
firemen demanded pay equal to that
of their counterparts in France (NC,
11 Oct 1999). Meanwhile, a two-
month strike paralyzed the domestic
airport at Magenta, because the pro-
flnks Union Syndicaliste des Travail-
leurs Kanak et Exploités (ustke)
objected to the hiring of a nonindige-
nous worker when young Caledo-
nians who had been trained were
unable to find jobs (NC, 10 June, 2
Aug 1999).
A broader pattern of strike actions
against Lafleur’s financial empire took
on even more obvious political over-
tones. In June, the powerful Union
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Syndicaliste des Ouvriers et Employés
de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (usoenc),
began a three-month campaign against
three companies owned by Lafleur’s
family—Cellocal, Sotrapa, and Sofra-
plast, manufacturers of packaging and
toilet products—because thirty-six
employees had been fired. As strikers
blockaded the companies and even
Lafleur’s political headquarters, occu-
pied buildings, and chained them shut,
Tontouta airport and the port also
suffered blockades, and anyone who
tried to cross the barriers was roughed
up. Within a month, usoenc, ustke
and two other unions organized a
general strike, and perhaps eight
thousand protesters marched through
Noumea to present a petition to the
High Commission and the Employers’
Federation, asking for more recogni-
tion and representation, as well as an
increase in the minimum wage to the
equivalent of us$1,000 per month.
Lèques, Frogier, and Lafleur all
accused the unions of playing politics,
and their leaders obliged by calling
the general strike “historic.”  Didier
Guénan of the usoenc told his peo-
ple, “You have proved that in this
country there are free men and
women. New Caledonia will never
develop if workers don’t have their
say” (NC, 9 July, 26 Aug, 8 Oct 1999;
ran, 11 June 1999). 
After a court ordered that the pro-
testers be removed, Lafleur climbed
the barricade outside Cellocal, shout-
ing “I’m President of this Province.
This is like living under a totalitarian
regime!” Guénan replied, “Look who’s
talking” (NC, 23 July 1999). In late
August, a government-company-union
settlement mandated that us$300,000
be paid to the thirty-six dismissed
employees and that other jobs be
found for them. Lafleur commented,
“I’m tired. My fighting spirit is intact,
but I’m 66. And I’d like to have time
to play the piano, paint, visit Central
Europe. . . . Already, I don’t chair the
Southern Province’s sessions any more,
and I’m tired of the National Assem-
bly meetings in Paris.” He named
Frogier as his preferred successor (NC,
30, 31 Aug 1999). Then a strike led
by ustke at Radio France Overseas
antagonized not only the rpcr and
the French state but also usoenc.
After initial protests in September,
ustke shut down the radio station 
for a week in October, because three
Kanak employees had been suspended
for trying to prevent a conservative
businessman from expressing his views
on a live talk show, thereby raising 
a number of difficult issues. When
Radio France Overseas rebroadcast
the show, but also agreed to suspend
its disciplinary actions pending a court
ruling and to encourage the promo-
tion of Kanak workers at the rfo,
both Lèques and usoenc objected
strongly over the issue of freedom 
of speech and equal treatment for 
all races. usoenc closed down the
station itself to show disapproval 
(NC, 27 Sep, 5–22 Oct 1999). In 
addition, tourism declined because 
of the strikes (NC, 8 Dec 1999).
The latter part of the year saw
planning to implement the transfer of
power from Paris to the territory,
including primary education, labor
relations, external trade, and mining
(NC, 20 Aug 1999), but the cost of
such devolution to local agencies
meant that revenues had to be
increased. In December, the Congress
reinstated a defunct general tax on
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services of 4 percent, as well as a gen-
eral tax on imports (NC, 8 Dec 1999).
Economic indicators remained fairly
robust despite all the industrial
actions: an increasing money supply
yet low inflation (pir, 13 Jan 1999;
NC, 31 Aug 1999), optimism by for-
eign investors due to the Noumea
Accord, the recovering nickel market,
and the prospect that the world’s
largest deposit of natural gas may lie
in local waters (pir, 29 June 1999, 
bh 1999; ran, 10 Nov 1999). Mean-
while, the new sixteen-member Senate
of traditional chiefs began its task of
articulating and safeguarding Kanak
identity, including land settlements
(NC, 30 Aug 1999), and the Congress
passed its first “law of the country,”
aimed at reducing health costs (NC, 
20 Oct 1999).
There were some encouraging signs
of national reconciliation and local
autonomy in 1999. The French Uni-
versity, for example, separated from
its parent in Tahiti and entered into
cooperative arrangements with uni-
versities in Fiji and Australia (ran, 9
Feb 1999); tales from Wallis and
Futuna, whose migrants make up
almost 10 percent of the local popula-
tion now, were featured along with
Kanak storytellers at the Jean-Marie
Tjibaou Cultural Center (pir, 19 Aug
1999); and a multiracial Green Party
formed to address growing environ-
mental issues in New Caledonia, such
as strip-mining (pir, 2 Feb 1999). In
addition, the names of Kanak soldiers
who fought for France in the world
wars will be added to those of Euro-
pean residents on the War Memorial
monument in central Noumea, and
letters from World War I soldiers (half
of whom were Kanak) were shown at
the Noumea Museum (NC, 7 June
1999; pir, 12 Nov 1999). Some con-
troversy arose over whether to rename
Possession Day, celebrated every 24
September to commemorate the first
landing by the French and their claim
of annexation in 1853. Moderate
Kanak on the new Citizenship Com-
mission wanted it called Citizenship
Day, but the local Council on Indige-
nous Peoples opposed the change, as
a reminder to everyone of the colonial
legacy (NC, 21 Sep, 1 Oct 1999).
david a chappell
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Vanuatu
1999 has seen the consolidation of
political events in Vanuatu from the
mid-nineties onward. It began with
sadness for Vanuatu with the death 
of Father Walter Lini in February. He
had suffered a stroke in 1987, but had
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remained active in politics, and at the
time of his death was the leader of the
opposition. In order to understand
Vanuatu’s current political situation
some awareness of the historical polit-
ical alliances within Vanuatu is neces-
sary. It is therefore appropriate to
begin a consideration of 1999’s politi-
cal situation with a brief review of
Lini’s role in politics from the found-
ing of Vanuatu. 
Lini had been instrumental in Van-
uatu’s struggle for independence, and,
as leader of the Vanua‘aku Party (vp)
had headed a stable government until
1987. The party’s major opposition
came from the Union of Moderate
Parties (ump) which was formed by
the union of several small franco-
phone parties. These parties were
largely distinguished by their support
bases, with the Vanua‘aku Party
attracting anglophone and the Union
of Moderate Parties francophone vot-
ers. This francophone-anglophone
divide continues to be a presence in
Vanuatu’s politics. After Lini’s stroke
in 1987 his leadership began to be
challenged by Barak Sope, whose
challenges to vp policy led to his dis-
missal from the cabinet. In late 1988
Sope broke from the Vanua‘aku Party
and formed the Melanesian Progres-
sive Party (mpp). Instability and dis-
satisfaction in the vp ranks continued
to grow and in 1991, following a vote
of no confidence, Donald Kalpokas
replaced Lini as prime minister and
leader of the Vanua‘aku Party. As a
result Lini formed the National United
Party (nup). In the elections of 1991
the Union of Moderate Parties, headed
by Maxime Karlot Korman, narrowly
defeated the Vanua‘aku Party and
quickly formed a coalition govern-
ment with the National United Party. 
Since 1991 the political situation
has remained fluid, with politicians
switching allegiances between parties
fairly freely, to the detriment of gover-
nance. The only significant changes 
to the political parties since 1991 are
Korman’s formation of the Vanuatu
Republican Party (vrp) in 1998 after
rivalry between Korman and Serge
Vohor, the leader of the Union of
Moderate Parties, and the presence of
members of Parliament drawing sup-
port from the Tanna-based John Frum
movement.
The appointment of Vanuatu’s first
ombudsman, Marie-Noelle Ferrieux-
Patterson, in 1994 resulted in the
exposure of a number of scandals
involving prominent politicians. As a
result of these reports attacks on the
position of ombudsman increased,
with the Council of Ministers attempt-
ing to terminate her employment in
1997. Although that move was unsuc-
cessful, after some legal scuffling the
Ombudsman’s Act was repealed. A
new Ombudsman Act (no 27 of 1998)
was passed in 1998, alongside a Lead-
ership Code Act (no 2 of 1998). These
new pieces of legislation can be used
effectively to ensure transparent and
accountable governance but have yet
to be fully tested. In the middle of
1999 Ferrieux-Patterson came to the
end of her term as ombudsman and
was replaced by Hannington Alatoa.
Since that time the office has been
maintaining a lower profile, while the
new ombudsman adjusts to his job.
The wrangle over the ombudsman
helped to increase dissatisfaction in
the government, and in early 1998,
following an ombudsman’s report
detailing improper management
522 the contemporary pacific • fall 2000
within the Vanuatu National Provi-
dent Fund, rioting occurred. This
resulted in a state of emergency being
declared. Money that was paid out of
the Provident Fund after this incident
led to increased liquidity in the econ-
omy. As a result a 20 percent devalua-
tion of the vatu was announced by
the Reserve Bank. Although this
devaluation was immediately revoked,
the resultant instability deterred for-
eign investors. It also had a significant
detrimental impact on tourism, which
is a major area of economic activity
for Vanuatu.
In this very unstable atmosphere,
the elections were held in March
1998. No party gained a clear major-
ity, and eventually the Vanua‘aku
Party, headed by Donald Kalpokas,
and the National United Party, headed
by Walter Lini, entered a coalition to
form a government with Kalpokas as
prime minister and Lini as deputy.
This coalition was stable until Octo-
ber 1998, when the National United
Party was sacked from the coalition
after alleged breaches of the coalition
agreement. The Vanua‘aku Party
immediately entered into a coalition
with breakaway members from the
Union of Moderate Parties and two
John Frum members of Parliament.  
The year 1999 saw the continua-
tion of a Kalpokas government, and
continuation of policies that were
committed to the furtherance of the
Comprehensive Reform Programme
(crp). This program, endorsed by 
the National Summit in June 1997, 
is similar to many other structural
adjustment programs in the Pacific
Islands region. Its features include
redefining the public sector and mak-
ing it more efficient and accountable,
encouraging private-sector-led growth,
and improving equity between sec-
tions of the population. The reform
program is largely being funded by
concessionary loans from the Asian
Development Bank. 
In accordance with this reform
program various pieces of legislation
were passed in 1998. Acts to increase
efficiency and accountability in the
public sector included the aforemen-
tioned Leadership Code Act. Acts that
were passed in order to ensure effec-
tive financial management and respon-
sibility, in both national and local gov-
ernments, include the Expenditure
Review and Audit Act (no 3 of 1998),
the Public Finance and Economic
Management Act (no 6 of 1998), and
the Government Contracts and Ten-
ders Act (no 10 of 1998). The gov-
ernment also underwent major
restructuring in accordance with the
Government Act (no 5 of 1998). Nine
ministries were created, each with
responsibility over a number of
departments. This replaced a previous
structure of almost thirty ministries,
each with smaller responsibility. Each
ministry is managed by a director
general, who has a managerial rather
than a political role. The number and
role of political advisors has also been
reduced. crp also aimed to right-size
the public sector by 10–15 percent,
and by the end of 1998 one hundred
and sixty-eight government employees
had received redundancy notices
(QER, Dec 1998). A Transition Unit,
which aimed to support those receiv-
ing redundancy notices and provide
retraining, was established and came
to an end in 1999.
The most significant act to encour-
age private sector growth was the
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Foreign Investment Act (no 15 of
1998), which established the Foreign
Investment Board, whose purpose is
“to receive assess and approve project
proposals from foreign investors. This
will be organised purely at a technical
level to fast track applications of for-
eign investors” (QER, Sept 1998). It 
is made up of various government
departments responsible for process-
ing applications relating to foreign
investment, and is essentially a “one-
stop shop” for foreign investors to
deal with. The taxation regime was
also altered, with a value-added tax
being introduced to Vanuatu. The
Value Added Tax Act (no 12 of 1998)
introduced a tax of 12.5 percent on
most goods and services and became
effective from 1 August 1998. Most
import tariffs were reduced as a result
of the new value-added tax.
While the Kalpokas government
remained in power in 1999, the politi-
cal front remained steadily committed
to the crp. The bulk of the political
change instituted by Kalpokas’ gov-
ernment was implemented in 1998,
making 1999 seem quiet. Taxation
revenue fell by 7.3 percent in the first
quarter of 1999 because of the intro-
duction of the value-added-tax system
and the reduction of import taxes,
and continued to be lower than pro-
jected throughout the year (QER,
March, June 1999). The revenue from
overseas grants was also significantly
lower than had been projected. The
laws encouraging the private sector
also seemed to affect the economy,
with the level of foreign investment
being satisfactory in the first half of
1999, sustaining levels of over 800
million vatu each quarter (QER, June
1999).
However, by the end of 1999 sup-
port for the Kalpokas government
dwindled. In August four by-elections
changed the balance of power. The
opposition, led by Mokin Stevens,
began expressing concern with the
Kalpokas government, largely because
it was “listening too much to foreign
advisors” (pir, 29 Nov 1999). On 25
November Kalpokas resigned in order
to avoid a vote of no-confidence.
Barak Sope, leader of the Melanesian
Progressive Party, was elected prime
minister and immediately announced
a government composed of his party,
the National United Party, the Union
of Moderate Parties, the Vanuatu
Republican Party, and the John Frum
ministers. The new cabinet includes
former prime ministers Serge Vohor
and Maxime Carlot Korman, whose
bitter rivalry within the Union of
Moderate Parties in 1997 led to Kor-
man forming his own party in 1998
(pir, 30 Nov 1999).
Preelection and immediate post-
election comments about there being
too many foreign advisors in Vanu-
atu, and questions about the value-
added-tax scheme raised some doubt
as to the future of the reform pro-
gram. In early December a petition
calling for the government to get rid
of the reform project, which had
gathered six thousand signatures, was
presented to Parliament. The immedi-
ate response by Sato Kilman, minister
in charge of the Comprehensive
Reform Programme, was that the
petition was “an insult and an embar-
rassment, as the present Government
is committed to reforming this coun-
try” (TP, 8 Dec 1999). Reducing the
value-added tax to around 6–8 per-
cent and reintroducing a turnover tax
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remains a policy, however (TP, 1 Dec
1999).
Of further concern were statements
made by Sope and directed at opposi-
tion leaders, journalists, and the pub-
lic that conspiracy and treason are
criminal offenses carrying a life sen-
tence (TP, 15 Dec 1999). Although
Sope’s comments are not legally cor-
rect, there is some concern about
whether freedom of speech will be
interfered with by the current gov-
ernment.
Although the government appears
to be stable at the moment, with a
number of potentially volatile politi-
cians in the cabinet, it remains to be
seen how long this situation will last.
The ousted Vanua‘aku Party has also
been reported in the media as trying
to rally support for a no-confidence
vote against the current prime minis-
ter. As yet it is too early to see what
effect the change in government will
have on the economy, and whether
this spells the beginning of another
unstable time in Vanuatu’s politics.
anita jowitt
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